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SASKATCHEWAN

LAW REVIEW

Aboriginal Title and the Supreme
Court: What's Happening?
Kent McNeil*

On May 29, 1998, Joshua Bernard, a Mi'kmaq from the Eel Ground
Reserve in New Brunswick, was charged with unlawful possession of
twenty-three spruce logs that had been cut by another member of his
community on lands the province claimed as Crown lands. 1 Similarly,
Stephen Frederick Marshall and thirty-four other Mi'kmaq Indians were
charged with unlawfully cutting timber on Crown lands between
November 1998 and March 1999 in five counties in mainland Nova
Scotia and three counties on Cape Breton Island. 2 In each case, the
Crown in right of the province alleged that the cutting took place
without lawful authorization. The accused admitted all elements of
the offences, but argued that they did not require authorization from
the Crown because, as Mi'kmaq, they had rights to harvest the logs
for the purpose of sale. They based those rights on their Aboriginal
title to the land where the cutting had taken place, and on a treaty
right to harvest resources in order to gain a moderate livelihood. They
also relied on Belcher's Proclamation of 17623 and the Royal
4
Proclamationof 1763.
These cases were consolidated on appeal before the Supreme
Court of Canada as R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard.5 In judgments

1
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4
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Osgoode Hall Law School. I would like to thank Valerie Culp for her very helpful
suggestions, and other assistance with this article, which is based on the
Saskatchewan Law Review Lecture I gave in Saskatoon on October 24, 2005. 1 am
also grateful to Shin Imai, Kathy Simo, Brian Slattery, and Kerry Wilkins for reading
and commenting on a draft.
The charges were laid under s. 67(1)(c) of the Crown Lands and Forests Act, S.N.B.
1980, c. C-38.1.
These charges were laid under s. 29 of the Crown Lands Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 114.
A copy of Belcher's Proclamation of 1762, issued on May 4, 1762, by Jonathan
Belcher, Lt. Governor of Nova Scotia, is available at the Nova Scotia Archives,
Mi'kmaq Holdings, Papers of the Colonial Office, CO 217, vol. 19, no. 27-28, or
available for electronic viewing at "The Maritime Treaties," online: Canada in the
Making <http://www.schoolnet.ca/autochtone/treaties/maritim8-e.html>.
Issued on October 7, 1763, by George Ill, and reproduced in R.S.C. 1985, App. II,
No. 1 [Royal Proclamation].
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, 255 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2005 SCC 43 [Marshall/Bernard].
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concurring in result but differing markedly in approach, McLachlin
C.J. and LeBel J. reversed decisions favourable to the accused made by
the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Courts of Appeal, and restored
the convictions entered by the trial judges. This decision is of vital
significance, in part because the Court ruled on the validity of an
Aboriginal title claim for the first time. Previously, in Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia,6 the Court had laid down the parameters for
Aboriginal title claims, but sent the matter back to trial without
coming to a decision on the merits (so far the case has not been
retried). In Marshall/Bernard,although McLachlin C.J. and LeBel J.
both purported to apply the principles established in Delgamuukw,
their interpretations of that case and their understandings of those
principles vary substantially. I therefore think it essential to critically
compare the Marshall/Bernardjudgments and assess their consistency
with the decision in Delgamuukw.
In this article, I am going to focus on the way the Marshall/Bernard
case dealt with the issue of Aboriginal title. In doing so, I do not mean
to discount the importance of the treaty issue or the Court's analysis of
Belcher's Proclamationof 1762 and the Royal Proclamation.In the limited
space available, I simply will not be able to deal with those matters.
I will start by providing a brief introductory background to the
issue of Aboriginal title in Canada, leading up to the Delgamuukw
decision. I will then examine that decision and attempt to explain
the principles established by it in relation to proof of Aboriginal title
in particular. I will then analyze the judgments of McLachlin C.J. and
LeBel J. in Marshall/Bernard,and provide an assessment of their
consistency with the Delgamuukw principles.
I. ABORIGINAL TITLE IN CANADA BEFORE DELGAMUUKW
The land rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada were acknowledged
as a matter of both policy and law by the Royal Proclamation,which
reserved as the hunting grounds of the Indian nations all lands
7
possessed by them that had not been ceded to the British Crown.
The Royal Proclamation also established a process for the surrender of
Indian lands to the Crown by treaty. This process was followed until
the 1920s, when Canada discontinued the practice of entering into
new treaties with Indian nations for acquisition of their lands. The
practice was revived in the 1970s, when Canada implemented a
comprehensive land claims policy for the settlement of Aboriginal

6
7

[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Delgamuukw].
See Brian Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, as affected by the
Crown's acquisition of their territories (D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1979)
(Saskatoon: Native Law Centre of Canada, 1979) [Slattery, Land Rights].

Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What's Happening?

283

title claims. 8 In the early 1990s, the Province of British Columbia,
which had previously refused to acknowledge that the Aboriginal
peoples had any land rights, 9 finally recognized the necessity of
negotiating treaties and, in concert with the federal government and
First Nations in the province, established the British Columbia Treaty
Commission to facilitate the negotiation of land claims. 10
Aboriginal title has also been recognized judicially since the
1880s, when the Privy Council in St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber
Company v. The Queen 11 appears to have accepted that the Saulteaux
Tribe in northwestern Ontario had, in the words of Lord Watson, "a
personal and usufructuary right" 12 to the lands possessed by them at
the time they entered into Treaty 3 with the Crown in right of
Canada in 1873.13 Although the Privy Council apparently regarded
the Royal Proclamation as the source of Aboriginal title in that
instance, the Supreme Court of Canada in Calder v. Attorney-General of
British Columbia1 4 acknowledged that the Royal Proclamation is not
the only source of Aboriginal title. Rather, in a passage that has been
relied upon in subsequent Supreme Court decisions, 15 Judson J.
observed:
Although I think that it is clear that Indian title in British
Columbia cannot owe its origin to the Proclamation of
1763, the fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians
were there, organized in societies and occupying the land
as their forefathers had done for centuries. This is what
Indian title means and it does not help one in the solution
of this problem to call it a "personal or usufructuary
right". 16

This passage also reveals Judson J.'s discomfort with Lord
Watson's description of Aboriginal title as a "usufructuary right," the
8

9
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See Living Treaties: Lasting Agreements, Report of the Task Force to Review
Comprehensive Claims Policy (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development, 1985) at 12-13.
See Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British
Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990). There was, however, a brief
period of treaty-making on Vancouver Island in the 1850s, and Treaty 8 (1899)
extends to the northeast corner of the province: see especially 18-20, 65-67.
See Christopher McKee, Treaty Talks in British Columbia: Negotiating a Mutually
Beneficial Future (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996), especially at 32-42.
(1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 [St. Catherine'sMilling].
Ibid. at 54.
Ibid.
[19731 S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 [Calder cited to S.C.R.].
See e.g. R. v. Van derPeet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 289 at para. 33 [Van
der Peet].
Calder, supra note 14 at 328.
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inadequacy of which the Supreme Court has continued to acknowledge.
In Guerin v. The Queen,17 Dickson J. (as he then was) said that although
descriptions of Aboriginal title as "a personal and usufructuary right"
and as a "beneficial interest" each contain "a core of truth," neither
accurately portrays the "sui generis interest" Indians have in their
traditionally occupied lands. 18 Dickson J. also accepted Duff J.'s
clarification in Attorney-General for Quebec v. Attorney-General for
Canada19 that the characterization of Aboriginal title as "personal"
refers to the fact that it is inalienable, other than by surrender to the
Crown. 20 Summing up, he observed:
The nature of the Indians' interest is therefore best
characterized by its general inalienability, coupled with the
fact that the Crown is under an obligation to deal with the
land on the Indians' behalf when the interest is surrendered. 2 1
Despite Dickson J.'s cautionary warning that "[a] ny description of
Indian title which goes beyond these two features is both unnecessary
and potentially misleading," 2 2 the Supreme Court felt obliged to
provide a more complete definition of Aboriginal title when faced
with a direct claim thereto by the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en nations
in Delgamuukw.2 3 In addition, the Court explained how Aboriginal
title can be proven, situated it within exclusive federal jurisdiction for
constitutional division-of-powers purposes, 24 and explained the effect
of constitutional recognition of it as an Aboriginal right by s. 35(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982.25 While declining to rule or even provide
direct guidance on the additional claim to a right of self-government,
I think the Court's views on the source and content of Aboriginal title
may shed significant light on this matter as well.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

[1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321 [Guerin cited to S.C.R.].
Ibid. at 382.
[1921] 1 A.C. 401 at 408, 56 D.L.R. 373 [cited to A.C.].
Guerin, supra note 17 at 382.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Supra note 6.
This is due to s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3,
reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5, which assigns to the Parliament of Canada
exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians"
[Constitution Act, 1867]. In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court held that Aboriginal
title lands are "Lands reserved for the Indians" within the meaning of this provision:
ibid. at paras. 174-76.
Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. Section 35(1) provides: "The
existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed."
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II. ABORIGINAL TITLE IN DELGAMUUKW v. BRITISH
COLUMBIA
While not deciding whether the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en nations
actually have Aboriginal title over the lands claimed by them in
British Columbia, in Delgamuukw the Supreme Court did provide
extensive guidance to trial judges on how to deal with an Aboriginal
title claim.
On the meaning of Aboriginal title, Lamer CJ., writing the principal
judgment, 2 6 accepted Dickson J.'s characterization of Aboriginal title
in Guerin as sui generis, and went on to explain how it differs from a
common law fee simple estate. First, however, he made perfectly clear
that Aboriginal title is a property right, rather than "a licence to use
and occupy the land [that] cannot compete on an equal footing with
other proprietary interests". 2 7 Moreover, he rejected the Crown's
argument that the content of Aboriginal title is limited to traditional
uses of the land. Instead, he stated:
Aboriginal title is a right in land and, as such, is more than
the right to engage in specific activities which may be
themselves aboriginal rights. Rather, it confers the right to
use land for a variety of activities, not all of which need be
aspects of practices, customs and traditions which are
integral to the distinctive cultures of aboriginal societies.
Those activities do not constitute the right per se; rather,
they are parasitic on the underlying title. However, that
range of uses is subject to the limitation that they must
not be irreconcilable with the nature of the attachment to
the land which forms the basis of the particular group's
28
aboriginal title.
Consequently, Aboriginal title encompasses mineral rights and rights to
oil and gas, even if exploitation of those resources was not a traditional
use of the land. 29 Aboriginal titleholders will not, however, be able to
make use of those resources if their exploitation destroys the value of
the land for traditional uses:
For example, if occupation is established with reference to
the use of the land as a hunting ground, then the group
that successfully claims aboriginal title to that land may
26
27

La Forest J. delivered a concurring judgment for himself and L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 113, affirming the Court's pronouncement on

28
29

this issue in CanadianPacificLtd. v. Paul, [198812 S.C.R. 654 at 677, 53 D.L.R. (4th)
487 [cited to S.C.R.].
Delgarnuukw, ibid. at para. 111.
Ibid. at para. 122.
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not use it in such a fashion as to destroy its value for such
30
a use (e.g., by strip mining it).
This inherent limit on Aboriginal title is one of the sui generis
aspects that distinguish it from a fee simple estate. Connected to this
is another unique aspect, namely the title's inalienability, other than
by surrender to the Crown. Lamer C.J. explained that inalienability
is, "in part, a function of the common law principle that settlers in
colonies must derive their title from Crown grant and, therefore,
cannot acquire title through purchase from aboriginal inhabitants". 3 1
Like the inherent limit, inalienability also has a protective purpose,
namely preserving the unique relationship that Aboriginal communities
have with their lands. 3 2 However, neither the inherent limit nor
inalienability prevents destruction of that relationship by surrender
of Aboriginal title to the Crown, 33 though in that context the Crown
is under stringent fiduciary obligations. 34
Another sui generis aspect of Aboriginal title is its communal nature.
Lamer C.J. said in Delgamuukw that "Aboriginal title cannot be held
by individual aboriginal persons; it is a collective right to land held
by all members of an aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect to that
land are also made by that community. '3 5 So unlike other property
rights that are held by either living persons or corporations,
Aboriginal title is vested in collective bodies that evidently have the
legal personality necessary to hold property in their own right.
Moreover, the decision-making authority Aboriginal communities
have in regard to their Aboriginal title lands is governmental in
nature, as was held by Williamson J. in Campbell v. British Columbia
(Attorney General).3 6 Aboriginal title therefore has a jurisdictional
quality that distinguishes it from land titles held by private persons
30

31
32
33
34
35
36

Ibid. at para. 128. This inherent limit on Aboriginal title, though undoubtedly
well-intentioned, is paternalistic and could seriously impair worthwhile economic
development: see "The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and Content of Aboriginal Title"
["Post-Delgamuukw"], in Kent McNeil, Emergingjustice? Essays on Indigenous Rights
in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre of Canada, 2001) 102 at
116-22 [EmergingJustice?]. Note too that the limitation is on use, not ownership, of
natural resources. So just because an Aboriginal nation cannot use certain
resources does not mean they belong to and can be exploited by the Crown, as
that would be completely contrary to the express purpose of the inherent limit,
which is to preserve the land for future generations: see Delgamuukw, supra note 6
at paras. 125-32.
Delgamuukw, ibid. at para. 129.
Ibid.
Ibid. at para. 131.
See Guerin, supra note 17; Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 193.
Supra note 6 at para. 115.
(2000), 189 D.L.R. (4th) 333, 2000 BCSC 1123 at paras. 134-38 [Campbell].
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and corporations. 3 7 This also helps to explain why it is inalienable,
other than by surrender to the Crown, because only another government
38
can acquire a title that is jurisdictional as well as proprietary.
The last sui generis aspect of Aboriginal title noted by Lamer C.J.
in Delgamuukw is its source. Rejecting the Royal Proclamation as the
source, he said "it is now clear that although aboriginal title was
recognized by the Proclamation,it arises from the prior occupation of
Canada by aboriginal peoples". 3 9 The relevance of this occupation is
twofold. First, at common law "the fact of physical occupation is
proof of possession at law, which in turn will ground title to the
land". 40 But Aboriginal title is unique in this regard because "it arises
from possession before the assertion of British sovereignty, whereas
normal estates, like fee simple, arise afterward". 4 1 Secondly, prior
occupation is relevant because Aboriginal peoples had their own
systems of law that governed their relationship with the land prior to
British sovereignty. Relying on Roberts v. Canada,4 2 where the Supreme
Court held unanimously that "aboriginal title pre-dated colonization
by the British and survived British claims of sovereignty,"' 43 Lamer
C.J. said this suggests "a second source for aboriginal title-the
relationship between common law and pre-existing systems of
44
aboriginal law".
Expanding on this relationship between common law and
Aboriginal law, Lamer C.J. commented on the arguments of counsel
on the source of Aboriginal title:
The respondents argue, in essence, that aboriginal title
arises from the physical reality at the time of sovereignty,
whereas the Gitksan effectively take the position that
aboriginal title arises from and should reflect the pattern of
land holdings under aboriginal law. However, as I have
explained above, the source of aboriginal title appears to be
grounded both in the common law and in the aboriginal
perspective on land; the latter includes, but is not limited

37

For more detailed discussion, see "Post-Delgamuukw", supra note 30 at 122-27.

38

See Kent McNeil, "Self-Government and the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title"

39
40
41
42
43
44

(2002) 47 McGill LJ. 473, where it is also argued (at 501-502) that Aboriginal title
should be transferable to other Aboriginal communities, a position supported by
La Forest J. in Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 198.
Delgamuukw, ibid. at para. 114.
Ibid. at para. 149.
Ibid. at para. 114 [emphasis in original].
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 322, 57 D.L.R. (4th) 197 [cited to S.C.R.].
Ibid. at 340.
Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 114.
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to, their systems of law. It follows that both should be taken
45
into account in establishing the proof of occupancy.
Relying on the view he had expressed in Van der Peet that account
must be taken of the "aboriginal perspective while at the same time
taking into account the perspective of the common law," 4 6 the Chief
Justice continued:
I also held that the aboriginal perspective on the occupation
of their lands can be gleaned, in part, but not exclusively, from
their traditional laws, because those laws were elements of
47
the practices, customs and traditions of aboriginal peoples.
He also posited a "general principle that the common law should
develop to recognize aboriginal rights (and title, when necessary) as
they were recognized by either de facto practice or by the aboriginal
48
system of governance".
How, then, does Aboriginal law function as a source of Aboriginal
title? One possibility would be through application of what is known
as the doctrine of continuity, whereby pre-existing rights under local
49
law continue after Crown acquisition of sovereignty over a territory.
If this doctrine were to apply, Aboriginal title would arise from and

be defined by Aboriginal law. 50 Clearly, this is not what Lamer Cj.
45
46
47
48
49

50

Ibid. at para. 147.
Ibid. at para. 148, referring to Van der Peet, supra note 15 at para. 50.
Ibid. at para. 148, referring to Van der Peet, supra note 15 at para. 41.
Ibid. at para. 159.
See Slattery, Land Rights, supra note 7 at 50-59; Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal
Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), especially at 171-79 [McNeil, Common Law];
Mark Walters, "British Imperial Constitutional Law and Aboriginal Rights: A Comment
on Delgamuukw v. British Columbia" (1992) 17 Queen's L.J. 350, especially at 407409; Mark Walters, "The 'Golden Thread' of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at
Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 1982" (1999) 44 McGill LJ. 711
[Walters, "Golden Thread"]; Russel Lawrence Barsh, "Indigenous Rights and the
Lex Loci in British Imperial Law" in Kerry Wilkins, ed., Advancing Aboriginal
Claims: Visions/Strategies/Directions(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2004) 91.
This is the approach to Aboriginal land rights that has been applied in Australia
and New Zealand: see Mabo v. Queensland (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1, 1992 HCA 23;
Western Australia v. Ward (2002), 191 A.L.R. 1, 2002 HCA 28; Members of the Yorta
Yorta Aboriginal Community v. Victoria (2002), 194 A.L.R. 538, 2002 HCA 58;
Attorney-General v. Ngati Apa, [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 643, 2003 NZCA 236. For critical
commentary on the Australian approach, see Kent McNeil, "Legal Rights and
Legislative Wrongs: Maori Claims to the Foreshore and Seabed" ["Maori Claims"],
in Claire Charters and Andrew Erueti, eds., Maori Property Rights in the Foreshore
and Seabed: The Latest Frontier (Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington
Press) [forthcoming], and "The Relevance of Traditional Laws and Customs to the
Existence and Content of Native Title at Common Law" in EmergingJustice?, supra
note 30 at 416.
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had in mind. In his lengthy discussion of Aboriginal title at common
law, 5 1 he never mentioned the doctrine of continuity per se, nor did
he suggest that the content of Aboriginal title depends on Aboriginal
law. On the contrary, in describing Aboriginal title and its sui generis
features, he evidently regarded it as a generic property right, the
substance of which does not vary from one Aboriginal nation to the
next. 5 2 Instead of regarding Aboriginal law as a source of Aboriginal
title that defines its content, the Chief Justice appears to have viewed
Aboriginal law as a means for establishing the occupation of land that
gives rise to this generic title.
He commenced his discussion of proof of title with this summary:
In order to make out a claim for aboriginal title, the
aboriginal group asserting title must satisfy the following
criteria: (i) the land must have been occupied prior to
sovereignty, (ii) if present occupation is relied on as proof
of occupation pre-sovereignty, there must be a continuity
between present and pre-sovereignty occupation, and (iii)
53
at sovereignty, that occupation must have been exclusive.
Commenting on the arguments of counsel on this matter, he
observed:
There was a consensus among the parties on appeal that
proof of historic occupation was required to make out a
claim to aboriginal title. However, the parties disagreed on
how that occupancy could be proved. The respondents assert
that in order to establish aboriginal title, the occupation
must be the physical occupation of the land in question.
The appellant Gitksan nation argue, by contrast, that
aboriginal title may be established, at least in part, by
54
reference to aboriginal law.
He then related these positions to the debate over the source of
Aboriginal title discussed above, and appears to have concluded that
51

Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at paras. 112-69.

52

See Brian Slattery, "Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (2000) 79 Can.
Bar Rev. 196 at 211-15. This conclusion is supported further by the fact that Lamer
CJ. discussed the inherent limit, which can vary from one Aboriginal nation to
the next, under a separate heading, following his discussion of the content of
Aboriginal title: Delgamuukw, ibid. at paras. 116-32. Recall as well that the inherent
limit is a restriction on the uses Aboriginal peoples can make of their lands, not a
limitation on the content of Aboriginal title: see supra note 30.
Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 143.
Ibid. at para. 146.

53
54
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occupation can be established by proof either of physical occupation
or Aboriginal law, or a combination of the two. Where physical
occupation is relied upon, it
may be established in a variety of ways, ranging from the
construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure
of fields to regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting,
fishing or otherwise exploiting its resources ....
In considering
whether occupation sufficient to ground title is established,
"one must take into account the group's size, manner of
life, material resources, and technological abilities, and the
character of the lands claimed". 5 5
On the other hand,
if, at the time of sovereignty, an aboriginal society had laws
in relation to land, those laws would be relevant to establishing
the occupation of lands which are the subject of a claim for
aboriginal title. Relevant laws might include, but are not
limited to, a land tenure system or laws governing land
56
use.
Aboriginal law can also be relied upon to show that the occupation
was exclusive. After noting that "proof of exclusivity must rely on both
5 7
the perspective of the common law and the aboriginal perspective,"
and warning that "[e]xclusivity is a common law principle derived
from the notion of fee simple ownership and should be imported into
the concept of aboriginal title with caution," 58 Lamer C.J. observed:
A consideration of the aboriginal perspective may also lead
to the conclusion that trespass by other aboriginal groups
does not undermine, and that presence of those groups by
permission may reinforce, the exclusive occupation of the
aboriginal group asserting title. For example, the aboriginal
group asserting the claim to aboriginal title may have
trespass laws which are proof of exclusive occupation, such
that the presence of trespassers does not count as evidence
against exclusivity. As well, aboriginal laws under which
permission may be granted to other aboriginal groups to
use or reside even temporarily on land would reinforce the
-5
56
57
58

Ibid. at para. 149, quoting from Brian Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights"
(1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 758.
Delgarnuukw, supra note 6 at para. 148.
Ibid. at para. 156.
Ibid.
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finding of exclusive occupation. Indeed, if that permission
were the subject of treaties between the aboriginal nations
in question, those treaties would also form part of the
aboriginal perspective. 59
But does Aboriginal law cease to be relevant once Aboriginal title
has been established by proof of exclusive occupation at the time of
Crown assertion of sovereignty? Lamer C.J. did not address this
question directly. We do know, however, that Aboriginal law does not
determine the content of Aboriginal title. But we also know that
Aboriginal title is communal, and that the title-holding community
has decision-making authority over it, authority that Williamson J.
regarded as governmental in Campbell.60 This must include authority
to make laws in relation to land that would be applicable within the
community. So in situations where a title-holding community
already had laws governing such things as land tenure and use, as
Lamer C.J. envisaged in Delgamuukw, 6 1 one would expect those laws
to retain their validity and continue to govern those matters until the
community decided, through the exercise of its decision-making
authority, to change them.
In addition to this jurisprudential perspective, there are practical
reasons why Aboriginal laws in relation to land would have had to
remain in force in Aboriginal communities after Crown sovereignty.
Regarding the Aboriginal title claims of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
nations, the lower courts found, and the parties did not contest on
appeal, "that British sovereignty over British Columbia was conclusively
established by the Oregon Boundary Treaty of 1846".62 At that time,
however, there was no official British presence in the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en territories, apart from a few Hudson's Bay Company
traders. 63 As demonstrated by extensive evidence at trial in
59
60
61
62
63

Ibid. at para. 157.
Supra note 36.
See the quotation accompanying note 56, supra.
Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 145.
A few European explorers had ventured past the continental divide in the late

eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, after which the Hudson's Bay Company
established forts on the northwest coast of what is now British Columbia. As the
forts were established, local Indians congregated around them in an attempt to
control the trade emanating from the forts, acting as middlemen between other
Indians and the company traders. The Gitksan were in contact with Europeans
during the first decade of the nineteenth century, but white settlement did not
encroach upon their territory until the late 1860s. See Marjorie M. Halpin &
Margaret Seguin, "Tsimshian Peoples: Southern Tsimshian, Coast Tsimshian,
Nishga, and Gitksan" in Wayne Suttles, ed., Handbook of North American Indians,

vol. 7 Northwest Coast (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1990) 267 at 281;
Robin Fisher, Contact & Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia,
1774-1890 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977) at 26-33.
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Delgamuukw, 6 4 the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en had complex systems
of law governing land holding within their territories. As a practical
matter, those laws must have remained in effect after Crown sovereignty
65
because there were no other laws that could have applied.
Extension of Canadian authority over the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
territories probably occurred gradually, most notably after the 1876
Indian Act 6 6 was applied to them. But the provisions of that Act
relating to lands applied only to Indian reserves, amounting to a tiny
fraction of the lands over which the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en assert
Aboriginal title. Moreover, the Aboriginal title lands of both those
nations should not have been subject to provincial land laws because
Aboriginal title has been under exclusive federal jurisdiction since
1867.67 So even after the extension of Canadian jurisdiction to their
territories, the only laws generally available to govern internal land
holding in relation to Aboriginal title lands outside of reserves would
have been Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en laws.
Lamer C.J. stated in Delgamuukw that, "from a theoretical
standpoint, aboriginal title arises out of prior occupation of the land
by aboriginal peoples and out of the relationship between the
common law and pre-existing systems of aboriginal law". 68 In my
opinion, this relationship is an on-going one. It began with Crown
sovereignty when the common law was received, and continues to
this day. The common law's role is to define and protect Aboriginal
title as against the Crown and third parties. This is why Aboriginal
title does not vary from one Aboriginal nation to the next, apart from
differences in restrictions on use imposed by the inherent limit.
While Aboriginal law is relevant to prove pre-sovereignty occupation,
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65

66
67

68

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185, [1991] 3 W.W.R. 97
(B.C.S.C.) [Delgamuukw, B.C.S.C.].
See "Aboriginal Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty"
in Emerging Justice?, supra note 30 at 90-92 ["Aboriginal Rights"], where this
matter of a legal vacuum is discussed in relation to the inherent right of selfgovernment.
S.C. 1876, 39 Vict., c. 18.
See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 24. For discussion, see Nigel Bankes,
"Delgamuukw, Division of Powers and Provincial Land and Resource Laws: Some
Implications for Provincial Resource Rights" (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 317; Kerry
Wilkins, "Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights" (1999) 22 Dal. LJ. 185, and
"Negative Capability: Of Provinces and Lands Reserved for the Indians" (2002) 1
Indigenous L.J. 57; Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and the Division of Powers:
Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction" (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 431 (also in
Emerging Justice?, supra note 30 at 249), and "Aboriginal Rights, Resource
Development, and the Source of the Provincial Duty to Consult in Haida Nation
and Taku River" (2005) 29 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 447 ["Provincial Duty to Consult"].
Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 145.
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it plays no role in the definition of Aboriginal title. 6 9 But after
sovereignty, it continues to apply internally to govern landholding
within Aboriginal territories, and is modifiable by Aboriginal
70
communities in the exercise of their decision-making authority.
Lamer C.J.'s decision in Delgamuukw can therefore be understood
as positing a legal regime for Aboriginal title lands that includes an
important on-going role for Aboriginal law and community authority.
Unlike fee simple lands, Aboriginal title lands are vested in communities
that have laws pre-dating Crown sovereignty. Such communities
have the legal personality necessary for them to have real property
rights that are defined and protected externally by the common law,
but that are governed internally by continuing Aboriginal law.
Moreover, Aboriginal law is not frozen at the time of sovereignty. As
Williamson J. recognized in Campbell, Aboriginal communities have
decision-making authority that is governmental in nature, the
71
exercise of which enables them to change their internal land laws.
Aboriginal title is therefore more than a proprietary interest. It has a
jurisdictional quality that removes it from common law estates in
72
land and makes it truly sui generis.
Let us now turn to Marshall/Bernard, and assess the Supreme
Court's approach to Aboriginal title claims in that case in light of our
analysis of Lamer CJ.'s judgment in Delgamuukw.
III. ABORIGINAL TITLE IN MARSHALL/BERNARD
In the leading judgment in Marshall/Bernard,McLachlin CJ. succinctly
set out what she called the "central issues" on appeal:
Can members of the Mi'kmaq people in Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick engage in commercial logging on Crown
lands without authorization, contrary to statutory regulation?
More precisely, do they have treaty rights or aboriginal title
73
entitling them to do SO?
In my respectful opinion, these opening questions beg a fundamental
question that the Court should have considered, namely are the sites
where the cutting took place Crown lands or Aboriginal title lands?
69

70
71
72
73

In addition to being in accord with Lamer C.J.'s judgment in Delgamuukw, this
conclusion is beneficial to Aboriginal title holders because, in some instances, it
probably means that the content of their title is more inclusive than it would be
if defined by their own systems of law: see the Australian decisions cited supra
note 50.
See "Aboriginal Rights", supra note 65, especially at 92-95.
Supra note 36.
See "Post-Delgamuukw", supra note 30 at 122-27.
Marshall/Bernard,supra note 5 at para. 1.
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We know from Delgamuukw that "aboriginal title encompasses the
right to exclusive use and occupation," 74 and includes standing
timber. 75 The Crown has the underlying title to Aboriginal title
lands, 76 but this underlying title does not include a beneficial interest
77
in natural resources such as timber as long as Aboriginal title exists.
Nor does the legislation under which the accused were charged in
Marshall/Bernardassist the Crown in this regard. The New Brunswick
Crown Lands and ForestsAct defines "Crown Lands" as "all or any part
of the lands vested in the Crown that are under the administration
and control of the Minister...." 78 Similarly, the Nova Scotia Crown
Lands Act defines "Crown lands" as "all or any part of land under
the administration and control of the Minister". 79 Given that lands
subject to Aboriginal title are vested in the Aboriginal titleholders,
and are under the jurisdiction of Parliament 80 rather than under the
administration and control of a provincial Minster, those lands are
outside the definition of "Crown lands" in the provincial legislation.
So according to both the concept of Aboriginal title formulated in
Delgamuukw and the relevant legislation, the lands in question had to
be either Crown lands or Aboriginal title lands-they could not be
both in any meaningful beneficial sense. 8 1 With respect, McLachlin
C.J. nonetheless seems to have thought that they could be both,
thereby revealing a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal
meaning of Aboriginal title, as described in Delgamuukw.
I think this misunderstanding arises from assuming the Crown's
underlying title has a beneficial value, in the sense that it entitles the
Crown to some immediate beneficial interest. This is not so. Section
109 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 provides:
All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the
several Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New
74
75
76
77

78

79
80
81

Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 117, Lamer C.J.
See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 145.
St. Catherine'sMilling, supra note 11 at 59. See also Delgamuukw, ibid. at para. 175. For
discussion, see Hamar Foster, "Aboriginal Title and the Provincial Obligation to Respect
It: Is Delgamuukw v. British Columbia 'Invented Law'?" (1998) 56:2 The Advocate 221.
Supra note 1, s. 1. "Minister" is defined in s. 1 as the "Minister of Natural
Resources" and includes any person designated by the Minister to act on the
Minister's behalf.
Supra note 2, s. 3. "Minister" is defined in s. 3 as the "Minister of Lands and Forests".
See ConstitutionAct, 1867, supra note 24.
For discussion of this issue in the context of Aboriginal title in British Columbia, see
"Provincial Duty to Consult", supra note 67 at 458-60. As pointed out in that article,
not only do provincial statutes relating to Crown lands generally not apply to
Aboriginal title lands as a matter of definition, they probably cannot do so for
constitutional division-of-powers reasons. See also the other articles cited supra
note 67.
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Brunswick at the Union, and all Sums then due or payable
for such Lands, Mines, Minerals, or Royalties, shall belong
to the several Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia,
and New Brunswick in which the same are situate or arise,
subject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any
82
Interest other than that of the Province in the same.
In St. Catherine'sMilling, the Privy Council held that Aboriginal title
is an "interest other than that of the Province" 8 3 within the meaning
of this provision, and this was affirmed by Lamer C.J. in
Delgamuukw.84 The nature of the underlying title the provincial
Crown has by virtue of s. 109 is therefore determined negatively: it
amounts to whatever interest remains after the Aboriginal title that
burdens it has been subtracted. This is the way s. 109 operates where
any interests in land are concerned, as they are all burdens on the
Crown's underlying title. For example, if burdened by a fee simple
estate, the Crown's underlying title does not amount to any present
beneficial interest, 85 but rather is a mere right to have the lands go
86
back to the Crown by escheat if the fee simple comes to an end.
Like a fee simple, Aboriginal title amounts to a right of exclusive use
and possession of potentially infinite duration that includes natural
resources. In neither case does the Crown have a present beneficial
interest.
82
83
84
85

86
87

87

Supra note 24, s. 109.
Supra note 11 at 58.
Supra note 6 at para. 175. See also Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Ministerof Forests),
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 511, 245 D.L.R. (4th) 33, 2004 SCC 73 at para. 59, McLachlin C.J.
Apart from precious minerals, which at common law belong to the Crown by
prerogative right: see Case of Mines (1568), 1 Plow. 310 at 336 (Ex. Ch.); AttorneyGeneral of British Columbia v. Attorney-General of Canada (1889), 14 App. Cas. 295
at 302 (P.C.).
See Attorney-General of Ontario v. Mercer (1883), 8 App. Cas. 767 (P.C.).
Note that the mistaken view that the Crown has a present beneficial interest in
Aboriginal title lands may be at least partially due to Lord Watson's statement in
St. Catherine'sMilling, supra note 11 at 58, that the Provincial "Crown has all along
had a present proprietary estate in the land, upon which the Indian title was a
mere burden". But his Lordship declined to specify the nature of the Aboriginal
interest, other than to describe it vaguely as "a personal and usufructuary right,"
a description the Supreme Court of Canada has found to be not particularly helpful:
see text accompanying notes 12-21, supra. In light of the all-encompassing nature
of Aboriginal title as defined by Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw (see text accompanying
notes 27-29, supra), I think it is now clear that the Crown's underlying title to
Aboriginal title lands is no more than a right equivalent to the right to escheat
that the Crown has in relation to fee simple lands. See also Marshall/Bernard,supra
note 5 at para. 135, where LeBel J.,
while finding the concept of a usufructuary right
to be useful in the context of Aboriginal title, nonetheless stated: "A usufructuary
title to all unsurrendered lands is understood to protect aboriginal peoples in the
absolute use and enjoyment of their lands" [emphasis added].
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While McLachlin C.J.'s apparent misapprehension (that Aboriginal
title lands could also be Crown lands for the purposes of the relevant
legislation) did not directly affect the outcome in the case, in my view
it reveals a lack of understanding of the concept of Aboriginal title
expressed in Delgamuukw that carried over into the matter of proof of
title in Marshall/Bernard.In relation to this, the Chief Justice stated
that "issues arise as to the standard of occupation required to prove
title, including the related issues of exclusivity of occupation, application
of this requirement to nomadic peoples, and continuity". 88 But
before turning directly to those issues, she said:
Two concepts central to determining aboriginal rights must
be considered .... The first is the requirement that both
aboriginal and European common law perspectives must be
considered. The second relates to the variety of aboriginal
89
rights that may be affirmed.
She then elaborated on the ways in which the Aboriginal and
European perspectives relate to proof of Aboriginal rights, including
title:
The Court's task in evaluating a claim for an aboriginal
right is to examine the pre-sovereignty aboriginal practice
and translate that practice, as faithfully and objectively as
it can, into a modern legal right. The question is whether
the aboriginal practice at the time of assertion of European
sovereignty (not, unlike treaties, when a document was
signed) translates into a modern legal right, and if so, what
right? This exercise involves both aboriginal and European
perspectives. The Court must consider the pre-sovereignty
practice from the perspective of the aboriginal people. But
in translating it to a common law right, the Court must
also consider the European perspective; the nature of the
right at common law must be examined to determine
whether a particular aboriginal practice fits it. This exercise
in translating aboriginal practices to modern rights must
not be conducted in a formalistic or narrow way. The Court
should take a generous view of the aboriginal practice and
should not insist on exact conformity to the precise legal
parameters of the common law right. The question is
88

Marshall/Bernard,supra note 5 at para. 40. The issue of continuity, while not

89

discussed in this article, has been addressed elsewhere: see Kent McNeil, "Continuity
of Aboriginal Rights" in Wilkins, supra note 49 at 127, and, in relation to McLachlin
C.J.'s comments on continuity in Marshall/Bernard,"Maori Claims", supra note 50.
MarshallBernard,supra note 5 at para. 45.
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whether the practice corresponds to the core concepts of
the legal right claimed. 90
Two aspects of McLachlin C.J.'s approach to this matter strike me
as remarkable. The first is her reliance on "Aboriginal practices," the
context in which she brings Aboriginal perspectives into the analysis:
Thus, to insist that the pre-sovereignty practices correspond
in some broad sense to the modern right claimed, is not to
ignore the aboriginal perspective. The aboriginal perspective
grounds the analysis and imbues its every step. It must be
considered in evaluating the practice at issue, and a generous
approach must be taken in matching it to the appropriate
modern right. 9 1
Moreover, as discussed below, she related Aboriginal practices, and
hence Aboriginal perspectives, to the physical occupation of land that
Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw characterized as the common law way of
establishing Aboriginal title. 9 2 Missing from her analysis is any
mention of the fact that Lamer C.J. said as well that the Aboriginal
perspective can also be gleaned from Aboriginal law, and that the
relationship between Aboriginal law and the common law can be
93
regarded as a second source of Aboriginal title.
The second aspect of this part of McLachlin C.J.'s judgment that
I find remarkable is the way it seems to conflate the test for proof of
Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw with the test for proving other
Aboriginal rights in Van der Peet.9 4 In Van der Peet, Lamer C.J. held
that Aboriginal rights are based on practices, customs or traditions
integral to distinctive Aboriginal cultures at the time of contact with
Europeans. 9 5 Unlike Aboriginal title, which we have seen is a generic
right not defined by Aboriginal practices, customs or traditions, other
Aboriginal rights are so defined and do vary because their nature is
determined by the pre-contact practices, customs or traditions of a
particular Aboriginal group. And yet McLachlin C.J. said in
Marshall/Bernardthat the task of the courts in Aboriginal title cases is
90
91

92

93

Ibid. at para. 48. For critical commentary on this aspect of McLachlin C.J.'s
decision, see Paul L.A.H. Chartrand, "R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard: The Return of
the Native..." U.N.B.L.J. [forthcoming].
Marshall/Bernard,supra note 5 at para. 50.

Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 149. See text accompanying note 55, supra,
where a passage from Delgamuukw relied upon by McLachlin C.J. in
Marshall/Bernard,supra note 5 at para. 49, is quoted.

Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at paras. 146-48. See text accompanying notes 43-48,

94

54-59, supra.
Supra note 15.

95

Ibid., especially at para. 46.
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to "examine the pre-sovereignty Aboriginal practice and translate
that practice into a modern right". 9 6 She elaborated as follows:
Different aboriginal practices correspond to different modern
rights .... One of these rights is aboriginal title to land. It is
established by aboriginal practices that indicate possession
similar to that associated with title at common law. In
matching common law property rules to aboriginal practice
we must be sensitive to the context-specific nature of
common law title, as well as the aboriginal perspective. The
common law recognizes that possession sufficient to ground
title is a matter of fact, depending on all the circumstances,
in particular the nature of the land and the manner in
97
which the land is commonly enjoyed.
Therefore, for Aboriginal title to be established, it appears to be
McLachlin C.J.'s view that Aboriginal practices in relation to land
have to amount to the kind of exclusive occupation that would
ground title at common law. While she stressed the importance of
Aboriginal perspectives in evaluating Aboriginal practices, the Chief
Justice did not explicitly consider Aboriginal law in her analysis.
Relying on Lamer C.J.'s judgment in Delgamuukw, she said that, "[t]o
establish title, claimants must prove 'exclusive' pre-sovereignty
'occupation' of the land by their forebears". 9 8 She continued:
"Occupation" means "physical occupation". This "may be
established in a variety of ways, ranging from the construction
of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields to
regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or
otherwise exploiting its resources": Delgamuukw, per Lamer
C.J., at para. 149. 9 9
But as we have seen, for Lamer C.J. proof of physical occupation
is only one way of establishing Aboriginal title; in addition, the
requisite occupation can be proven through Aboriginal systems of
law. 10 0 Ignoring this aspect of his judgment, 10 1 McLachlin C.J.
moved on immediately to discuss the requirement of exclusivity of
occupation. Relying again on Delgamuukw, she said that "[e]xclusive
96

Marshall/Bernard,supra note 5 at para. 51.
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Ibid. at paras. 53-54.
Ibid. at para. 55, citing Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 143.

99

Marshall/Bernard,supra note 5 at para. 56.

100 See text accompanying notes 54-56, supra.
101 This is all the more surprising in light of her concurrence in his judgment in
Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 209.
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occupation means 'the intention and capacity to retain exclusive
control"'. 10 2 She elaborated as follows:
The right to control the land and, if necessary, to exclude
others from using it is basic to the notion of title at common
law. In European-based systems, this right is assumed by
dint of law. Determining whether it was present in a presovereignty aboriginal society, however, can pose difficulties.
Often, no right to exclude arises by convention or law. So
10 3
one must look to evidence.
While McLachlin C.J. did acknowledge in this passage that
Aboriginal societies might have a right to exclude by virtue of their
own laws, she seems to have regarded this as either unlikely or
unprovable in most instances. So she again emphasized the need for
factual evidence, this time of control. Recognizing that such evidence
might also be hard to come by, especially as "the people may have
been peaceful and have chosen to exercise their control by sharing
rather than exclusion," 10 4 she concluded:
It follows that evidence of acts of exclusion is not required to
establish aboriginal title. All that is required is demonstration
of effective control of the land by the group, from which a
reasonable inference can be drawn that it could have
excluded others had it chosen to do so. The fact that history,
insofar as it can be ascertained, discloses no adverse claimants
may support this inference. This is what is meant by the
requirement of aboriginal title that the lands have been
occupied in an exclusive manner.105
Again, McLachlin C.J.'s approach to exclusivity can be contrasted
with that of Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw, where he explicitly endorsed
the use of Aboriginal law to prove exclusivity.106
In her discussion of whether "nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples"
can have Aboriginal title, McLachlin C.J. once again stressed physical
occupation:
Whether a nomadic people enjoyed sufficient "physical
possession" to give them title to the land, is a question of
102 Marshall/Bernard,supra note 5 at para. 57, citing Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para.
103
104
105
106

156.
Ibid. at para. 64.
Ibid.
Ibid. at para. 65.
See text accompanying notes 58-59, supra.
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fact, depending on all the circumstances, in particular the
nature of the land and the manner in which it is commonly
used. Not every nomadic passage or use will ground title to
land.. .On the other hand, Delgamuukw contemplates that
"physical occupation" sufficient to ground title to land
may be established by "regular use of definite tracts of land
for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its resources"
(para. 149). In each case, the question is whether a degree
of physical occupation or use equivalent to common law
title has been made out.107
She did not discuss the fact that the Aboriginal people may have had
laws restraining others from entering or using lands within their
territory without permission, and that the existence of those laws would
be evidence of their control even when they were not physically
10 8
present on the lands.
Turning to the application of the legal test for proof of Aboriginal
title, McLachlin C.J. found that the trial judges had applied the right
test and arrived at the correct result when they found that Aboriginal
title had not been established to the lands where the timber had been
cut. She said, "[i]n each case, they required proof of sufficiently
regular and exclusive use of the cutting sites by Mi'kmaq people at
the time of assertion of sovereignty." 1 0 9 She found this approach to
be in keeping with the law of Aboriginal title, unlike the less strict test
for occupation applied in the Court of Appeal by Cromwell J.A. in R.
v. Marshall (S.F.)11 0 and Daigle J.A. in R. v. Bernard (j.).111 Instead of
requiring proof of physical occupation of the specific cutting sites at
the relevant time, those judges took what might be described as a
territorial approach. After extensive discussion of both the common law
107 Marshall/Bernard,supra note 5 at para. 66, quoting Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at
para. 149.
108 Compare the quotation from Delgamuukw accompanying note 59, supra, where
Aboriginal laws of this sort were contemplated and regarded as relevant by Lamer
CJ. For a discussion of Aboriginal title claims by so-called nomadic peoples, see
Brian J. Burke, "Left Out in the Cold: The Problem with Aboriginal Title Under
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 for Historically Nomadic Aboriginal
Peoples" (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1. For American case law on the Aboriginal
title of nomadic peoples, see United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 at 381, 6 S. Ct.
1109 (1886) [cited to U.S.]; Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 at 227, 43 S. Ct.
342 (1923) [cited to U.S.]; Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States,
324 U.S. 335 at 338-40, 65 S.Ct. 690 (1945) [Shoshone Indians cited to U.S.]; TeeHit-Ton Indians v. UnitedStates, 120 F.Supp. 202 at 204 (Ct. Cl. 1954), aff'd 348 U.S.
272 at 285-88, 75 S.Ct. 313 (1955) [cited to U.S.].
109 Marshall/Bernard,supra note 5 at para. 72.
110 (2003), 218 N.S.R. (2d) 78, [2004] 1 C.N.L.R. 211, 2003 NSCA 105 [Marshall].
111 (2003), 262 N.B.R. (2d) 1, 230 D.L.R. (4th) 57, 2003 NBCA 55 [Bernard].
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and Mi'kmaq perspectives on occupation, property, and territoriality,
Cromwell J.A. summarized what he regarded as the correct position:
The test as expressed in Delgamuukw is whether the claimant
has established exclusive occupation at sovereignty of the
lands claimed. The question, in my opinion, is not whether
exclusive occupation of the cutting sites was established,
but whether exclusive occupation of a reasonably defined
territory which includes the cutting sites, was established.
Insistence on proof of acts of occupation of the specific
cutting sites within that territory is, in my opinion, not
consistent with either the common law or the aboriginal
1 12
perspective on occupation.
Similarly, in Bernard,Daigle J.A. regarded the Aboriginal title claim of
the Mi'kmaq as a claim to territory rather than as a claim to specific
sites:
It should be remembered, as pointed out earlier, that the
appellant's claim in this case is for aboriginal title of the
traditional Mi'kmaq territory, the Northwest Miramichi
watershed, encompassing therein the Sevogle area [where
the cutting took place]. The claim before the trial judge is
not one for a site-specific right or activity that at the time
of contact was exercised in the Sevogle area by the
Mi'kmaq. The proof of a site-specific activity is part of the
Van der Peet test for aboriginal rights. That test does not
apply here because to ground aboriginal title the appellant's
claim is clearly asserted on the basis of pre-sovereignty
occupation of the Mi'kmaq traditional territory and is
founded on evidence aimed at proving such occupation. It
is true that to be exempt from the legislation under which
he is charged and have the benefit of a valid defence, the
appellant must demonstrate that the place where the
offence was committed is located within the Mi'kmaq
territory over which aboriginal title is asserted. That can be
done by showing that the territorial scope of the claimed
area includes the locus of the offence, the Sevogle area.
There is no requirement in the law that site-specific
harvesting rights be established precisely with regard to
the Sevogle area because it is alleged that the offence
11 3
occurred there.
112 Marshall, supra note 110 at para. 183.
113 Bernard, supra note 111 at para. 85.
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By endorsing the trial judges' requirement of proof of occupation
of the specific cutting sites, McLachlin C.J. appears to have rejected
the territorial approach of the Court of Appeal judges, 114 and, as
suggested above, 115 conflated the tests for proof of Aboriginal title
and other Aboriginal rights in a way Daigle J.A. in particular was
anxious to avoid. In my opinion, however, the territorial approach
is more in keeping with the unique character of Aboriginal title,
combining as it does proprietary and jurisdictional elements. 116 With
respect, I think McLachlin C.J.'s proprietary approach fails to take
sufficient account of the sui generis aspects of Aboriginal title described
by Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw, in particular its communal nature
and the decision-making authority that is vested in the Aboriginal
titleholders. 1 17 Aboriginal title more closely resembles the kind of
interest and authority a governmental entity has over a territory than
it does the kind of property right an individual or corporation has
118
over a parcel of land.
Although the decision in Marshall/Bernard was unanimous in
result, LeBel J., in a judgment concurred in by Fish J., expressed views
on the source and proof of Aboriginal title that differed substantially
from those of McLachlin C.J. Justice LeBel was particularly concerned
that the Chief Justice's approach was "too narrowly focused on common
law concepts relating to property interests" 119 and might preclude
proof of Aboriginal title by nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples. 12 0
114 Compare the American approach to proof of Aboriginal title, which is clearly
territorial. In United States v. SantaFe Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339, 62 S.Ct. 248
at 345 (1941) [cited to U.S.], Douglas J., for a unanimous Supreme Court, stated in
relation to the title claim of the Walapais Indians: "Occupancy necessary to establish
aboriginal possession is a question of fact to be determined as any other question
of fact. If it were established as a fact that the lands in question were, or were
included in, the ancestral home of the Walapais in the sense that they constituted
definable territory occupied exclusively by the Walapais (as distinguished from
lands wandered over by many tribes), then the Walapais had 'Indian title' which,
unless extinguished, survived the railroad grant of 1866." This case was cited by
Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 158, in the context of exclusive
occupation and joint Aboriginal title. See also Shoshone Indians, supra note 108 at
338-39; Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska v. United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 130, 389
F.2d. 778 at 785-86 (1968) [cited to F.2d.]. In United States v. Seminole Indians, 180
Ct. Cl. 375 at 385-86 (1967), Collins J. said "the Government leans far too heavily
in the direction of equating 'occupancy' (or capacity to occupy) with actual
possession, whereas the key to Indian title lies in evaluating the manner of landuse over a period of time. Physical control or dominion over the land is the
dispositive criterion" [emphasis in original].
115 See text accompanying notes 94-97, supra.
116 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
118 See "Post-Delgamuukw", supra note 30 at 124-25.
119 Marshall/Bernard,supra note 5 at para. 110.
120 Ibid. at para. 126.

Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What's Happening?

303

Relying on passages from Lamer CJ.'s judgment in Delgamuukw that
emphasized the sui generis qualities of Aboriginal title, the relevance
of Aboriginal law as a source of Aboriginal title, and the need to "give
12 1
equal consideration to the aboriginal and common law perspectives,"
LeBel J. stated that
aboriginal conceptions of territoriality, land-use and property
should be used to modify and adapt the traditional common
law concepts of property in order to develop an occupancy
standard that incorporates both the aboriginal and common
law approaches. Otherwise, we might be implicitly accepting
the position that aboriginal peoples had no rights in land
prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty because their
views of property or land use do not fit within Euro-centric
12 2
conceptions of property rights.
After acknowledging the difficulty of introducing "aboriginal conceptions
of property and ownership into the modern property law concepts of
the civil law and common law systems," he continued: "Aboriginal
title has been recognized by the common law and is in part defined
by the common law, but it is grounded in aboriginal customary laws
relating to land. The interest is proprietary in nature and is derived
from inter-traditional notions of ownership." 12 3
LeBel J. also took direct aim at McLachlin C.J.'s use of Aboriginal
perspectives in a limited way to assess Aboriginal practices in relation
to land:
The role of the aboriginal perspective cannot be simply to
help in the interpretation of aboriginal practices in order to
assess whether they conform to common law concepts of
title. The aboriginal perspective shapes the very concept of
aboriginal title. "Aboriginal law should not just be received
as evidence that Aboriginal peoples did something in the
past on a piece of land. It is more than evidence: it is
actually law. And so, there should be some way to bring to
the decision-making process those laws that arise from the
standards of the indigenous people before the court." 12 4
This passage suggests as well that Aboriginal law is more than evidence
of occupation and use of land. Law involves the exercise of jurisdiction,
121
122
123
124

Ibid. at para. 129. (See also para. 139.)
Ibid. at para. 127.
Ibid. at para. 128.
Ibid. at para. 130, quoting from John Borrows, "Creating an Indigenous Legal
Community" (2005) 50 McGill L.J. 153 at 173. (See also ibid. at para. 136.)
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and when that law is in relation to land the jurisdiction is territorial. 125
It is conceptually different from the site-specific physical occupation
that the trial judges required and that McLachlin C.J. accepted as the
appropriate standard. Disagreeing with the Chief Justice, LeBel J. said
"[o]ccupation should therefore be proved by evidence not of regular
and intensive use of the land but of the traditions and culture of the
group that connect it with the land". 126 For him, those traditions
12 7
include "aboriginal conceptions of territoriality".
LeBel J.'s approach, taking into account as it does Aboriginal law
and conceptions of territoriality, is thus much closer to that of Cromwell
J.A. and Daigle J.A. in the Courts of Appeal. 128 Commenting positively
on Cromwell J.A.'s approach, he said:
He attempted to take the different patterns of First Nations
land use into consideration in order to effect a legal
transposition of the native perspective and experience into
the structures of the law of property. He stayed within the
framework of this part of the law while remaining faithful
to the tradition of flexibility of the common law, which
should allow it to bridge gaps between sharply distinct
cultural perspectives on the relationship of different peoples
12 9
with their land.
But LeBel J. ultimately dismissed the Aboriginal title claim because he
found that the factual record lacked the necessary evidentiary foundation.
He nonetheless did not regard this as "a final determination of the
issue of aboriginal title rights in Nova Scotia or New Brunswick. A
final determination should be made only where there is an adequate
evidentiary foundation that fully examines the relevant legal and
historical record." 13 0 Concluding on this note, LeBel J. observed that
the evidentiary problems may have arisen from the fact that the
Aboriginal title claims were raised in the context of summary conviction
proceedings for violations of provincial statutes, rather than in the
more appropriate context of civil actions. He said "the criminal process
125 See Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. 47, where the International Court of
Justice considered conflicting French and British claims to territorial sovereignty
based on occupation of islands in the English Channel. Regarding the evidence of
occupation presented by Britain, the Court said at 65: "Of the manifold facts
invoked by the United Kingdom Government, the Court attaches, in particular,
probative value to the acts which relate to the exercise of jurisdiction and local
administration and to legislation."
126 Marshall/Bernard,supra note 5 at para. 140.
127 Ibid. at para. 127. See text accompanying note 122, supra.
128 See text accompanying notes 110-13, supra.
129 Marshall/Bernard,supra note 5 at para. 130.
130 Ibid. at para. 141.
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is inadequate and inappropriate for dealing with such claims," 13 1
especially given the impact they may have on "competing rights and
interests of a number of parties who may have a right to be heard at
all stages of the process". 13 2 He suggested that a way of dealing with
this would be "to seek a temporary stay of the charges so that the
13 3
aboriginal claim can be properly litigated in the civil courts".
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Prior to Delgamuukw, the source of Aboriginal title in Canadian law
remained uncertain. Aboriginal law and the common law had each
been proposed as viable, alternative sources, but the Supreme Court
had not yet pronounced on the matter.1 34 If Aboriginal law was relied
upon, the doctrine of continuity would apply, and so Aboriginal title
would be derived from, and be defined by, the pre-existing laws of the
Aboriginal people in question. 1 35 If the common law was relied
upon, Aboriginal title would depend on occupation of lands by
Aboriginal peoples at the time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty
and the legal effect given to occupation by the common law. 13 6 Chief
Justice Lamer's decision in Delgamuukw amounts to an innovative
combination of these two approaches: occupation of land at the time
of Crown sovereignty is the standard giving rise to Aboriginal title,
but Aboriginal law as well as physical presence and use can be utilized
to prove the requisite occupation. The resulting title is a common law
rather than an Aboriginal law title, but it is unlike any previouslyknown common law interest in land because it has several sui generis
aspects, specifically pre-sovereignty source, inalienability, communal
13 7
nature, and inherent limit.
In my respectful opinion, Chief Justice McLachlin's approach to
Aboriginal title is a disappointing retreat from the innovative aspects
of Lamer C.J.'s decision in Delgamuukw. For her, the legal effect given
to physical occupation by the common law is the source of Aboriginal
title, while Aboriginal law seems to be of little relevance. But this
common law approach is only one way of asserting Aboriginal land
rights. What if Aboriginal claimants chose instead to pursue a claim
based on their own laws and the doctrine of continuity, rather than
on the basis of common law Aboriginal title? Like the land rights
131 Ibid. at para. 143.
132 Ibid. at para. 142.
133 Ibid. at para. 144. For insightful commentary on this aspect of LeBel J.'s judgment,
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see Shin Imai, "The Adjudication of Historical Evidence: A Comment and an
Elaboration on a Proposal by Justice LeBel" U.N.B.L.J. [forthcoming].
See McNeil, Common Law, supra note 49, especially at 193-96, 274-90.
See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
See McNeil, Common Law, supra note 49, especially at 196-208.
See supra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.
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the French had under their own laws prior to the Crown's acquisition
of sovereignty in Canada, 13 8 those rights should have continued
thereafter. 13 9 Moreover, neither Delgamuukw nor Marshall/Bernard
contains any suggestion that they would not have done so. 14 0 In fact,
McLachlin J. herself, dissenting in Van der Peet before she became
Chief Justice, recognized the doctrine of continuity as a "golden
thread" running through the long history of relations between the
Crown and Aboriginal peoples:
This much is clear: The Crown, upon discovering and
occupying a "new" territory, recognized the law and custom
of the aboriginal societies it found and the rights in the
lands they traditionally occupied that these supported ....
It
follows that the Crown in Canada must be taken as having
accepted existing native laws and customs and the interests
in the land and waters they gave rise to, even though they
found no counterpart in the law of England. In so far as
an aboriginal people under internal law or custom had
used the land and its waters in the past, so it must be
regarded as having the continuing right to use them,
14 1
absent extinguishment or treaty.
Although Lamer C.J. for the majority in Van der Peet took a different
approach to Aboriginal rights, applying what has become known as
the "integral to the distinctive culture test," 1 42 his judgment would
138 See Drulard v. Welsh (1906), 11 O.L.R. 647 (Ont. Div. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds
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140

141

142

(1907), 14 O.L.R. 54 (Ont. C.A.); Corinthe v. Le Sdminaire de Saint-Sulpice (1911), 21
R.J.Q. 316, 4 C.N.L.C. 67 at 321-24 [cited to R.J.Q.] aff'd [1912] A.C. 872, 5 D.L.R.
263 (P.C.); and discussion in Slattery, Land Rights, supra note 7 at 167-74.
For discussion of the application of the doctrine of continuity to Aboriginal rights,
see Michael Halewood, Common Law Aboriginal Knowledge Protection Rights:
Recognizing the Rights of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada to Prohibit the Use and
Disseminationof Elements of their Knowledge (D. Jur. Dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law
School, 2005) at 200-44 [unpublished]; Walters, "Golden Thread", supra note 49;
Barsh, supra note 49.
Note that the Delgamuukw case was originally presented at trial as a claim based
on land rights under Aboriginal law (see Delgamuukw, B.C.S.C., supra note 64), but
by the time the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada the claim had been
modified to one based on Aboriginal title: see Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at paras.
7, 73, Lamer C.J.
Van der Peet, supra note 15 at paras. 268-69, 261. For commentary, see Walters,
"Golden Thread", supra note 49. See also Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911,
199 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 2001 SCC 33 at para. 10, where McLachlin C.J., delivering
the leading judgment, said that "aboriginal interests and customary laws were
presumed to survive the assertion of sovereignty, and were absorbed into the
common law as rights". This passage was quoted by LeBel J. in Marshall/Bernard,
supra note 5 at para. 133.
See text accompanying note 95, supra.
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not seem to preclude the application of the doctrine of continuity in
a properly pleaded case where Aboriginal law is explicitly relied on to
14 3
establish an Aboriginal right, including a right to land.
But in-between the common law approach McLachlin C.J. took in
Marshall/Bernard, and the Aboriginal law approach she espoused in
Van der Peet, is the Delgamuukw approach that combines elements of
both. While her deviation from the Delgamuukw approach was revealed
by her colleague LeBel J., her reasons for deviating from it are unclear,
especially in light of the fact that she concurred with Chief Justice
Lamer's decision in Delgamuukw and purported to follow that decision
in Marshall/Bernard.
In my opinion, the Delgamuukw approach is superior to both a
strict common law approach and a strict Aboriginal law approach
because it acknowledges the unique qualities of Aboriginal title and
provides jurisdictional space for self-government. 144 The pre-Crown
sovereignty source of Aboriginal title in collective occupation of
lands by Aboriginal peoples, the title's inalienability, its communal
nature, and the governmental authority that Aboriginal communities
have over it all reveal that it cannot be conceptualized as a mere
property right. Instead, it is in the nature of a territorial right that has
both proprietary and jurisdictional elements. 1 45 The Delgamuukw
approach also allows for the application of both the common law and
Aboriginal systems of law post-Crown sovereignty: the common law
applies externally to define and protect the rights of the Aboriginal
titleholders vis-i-vis the Crown and others, whereas Aboriginal law
applies internally to define rights and obligations with respect to the
land within the Aboriginal territory. Moreover, the decision-making
authority of the Aboriginal community that was acknowledged in

143 This should be especially so where the Aboriginal law was integral to the distinctive
culture of the people in question because it would then qualify as a practice, custom
or tradition within the scope of the test: see Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 148,
where Lamer C.J. stated that he had held in Van der Peet "that the aboriginal
perspective on the occupation of their lands can be gleaned, in part, but not
exclusively, from their traditional laws, because those laws were elements of the
practices, customs and traditions of aboriginal peoples". See also Casimel v.
Insurance Corp. of British Columbia (1993), 106 D.L.R. (4th) 720, [1994] 2 C.N.L.R.
22 (B.C.C.A.) [cited to D.L.R.], where the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in a
unanimous, pre- Van der Peet decision, held that an adoption under customary law
"was an integral part of the distinctive culture of the Stellaquo Band of the Carrier
People" (per Lambert J.A., ibid. at 733).
144 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. My own thinking on this has
moved beyond the views expressed in my book, Common Law Aboriginal Title,
supra note 49, published in 1989, which did not envisage the combined approach
developed in Delgamuukw and did not take account of the connection between
land rights and self-government.
145 See "Post-Delgamuukw", supra note 30, and "Aboriginal Rights", supra note 65.
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Campbell1 4 6 to be governmental in nature provides them with the
jurisdiction to modify their internal laws to meet their changing
needs and priorities.
Does McLachlin C.J.'s majority decision in Marshall/Bernardmean
that the combined common law/Aboriginal law approach that Lamer
C.J. espoused in Delgamuukw has been replaced by a strict common
law approach? I do not think so. First of all, McLachlin CJ. purported
to follow Delgamuukw, and did not explicitly reject any part of it.
Moreover, the evidence of Aboriginal law in MarshallBernardwas not
particularly strong, leading even LeBel J. to dismiss the Aboriginal
title claim on the facts, despite his acceptance of the relevance of
Aboriginal law to such claims. 1 4 7 In future cases, therefore, I think it
will be important for Aboriginal title claimants to present strong
evidence of the existence and application of Aboriginal law in relation
to land, in addition to evidence of physical occupation, particularly
where they are asserting title over their traditional territory rather
than over specific sites. In the face of such evidence, which was
largely absent from the factual record in Marshall/Bernard,one would
expect the Supreme Court to either follow Delgamuukw and accept
the relevance of such evidence, or retreat from that decision and
explicitly modify the law. I do not think the Court would be able to
ignore direct evidence of Aboriginal land laws and purport to abide
by the Delgamuukw decision at the same time.

146 Supra note 36.
147 Compare Cromwell J.A.'s judgment in Marshall, supra note 110 at paras. 145-52,
where some limited evidence of Aboriginal perspectives on land tenure and use
was reviewed and relied upon. See also Bernard, supra note 111, especially at paras.
104-12.

